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ABSTRACT 
The Basque desire for independence or self-governance has been a part of Basque 
political culture since the medieval era. The Basques have a history of democracy and 
preserved their self-governance in the face of invasion and domination for many centuries. 
The purpose of this thesis is to track the movement to the current day and address what 
has become known as “The Basque Question”, which refers to what exactly Spain should 
do with its Basque population and the Autonomous region. I address the two major 
aspects of the movement, which include the Basque terrorist group known as Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (“Basque Homeland and Freedom”) and the national political parties within 
the Basque region. I also examine the roots of the nationalist movement and how it 
relates to Basque identity. The conclusion is a policy recommendation for the Spanish 
government on how they should address the situation in light of recent elections within 
the Basque country and new developments with ETA. 
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Introduction 
The Basque culture is one with historic origins. While less is known about the 
Basques before the 16th century when they were assimilated into the French and Spanish 
states respectively, their language is a major indicator of their historic presence. It is the 
only remaining language in Europe to predate Indo-European origins and is unrelated to 
any other. The language, known as “Euskara” or “Euskera”, like the Basque people, 
endured through the Roman conquest, the Moorish invasion, and all subsequent attempts 
at assimilation. This is an incredibly impressive fact, given that the Basque culture, 
despite its long existence prior to the 16th century, did not have a written history until the 
10th century, from which a Basque phrase is found in the Glosas Emilianenses.1  The first 
book written in Basque wasn’t published until 1545. For centuries, there was no formal 
government of the Basque country, and therefore no institution that could have aided in 
the continued existence of the Basque language or culture. Yet, it prevailed nevertheless. 
Government in early Basque history was actually very informal and highly localized. The 
period of the most visible change to Basque governance was certainly in the 19th, and 
especially the 20th century.2 Today political activism is part of the Basque culture and 
while the Basque country is not without political divisions in itself, the theme that has 
arguably dominated Basque politics across history, is the domination by an external 
group and the struggle to keep their freedoms in the face of the “next threat.”3  
Opportunities in the past century have come up to gain more independence or autonomy, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 "European Partnership for Independence," Euskal Herria, 2012, accessed April 02,2014, 
http://www.epicentres.info/index.php/euskal-herria. 
2 Cameron Watson, Modern Basque History: Eighteenth Century to the Present (Reno: Center for Basque 
Studies, University of Nevada, Reno, 2003), 17. 
3 Ibid.  
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and the Autonomy Statute of 1978 was a major step towards this goal, but in general 
negotiations, and especially actual implementation, have fallen short of expectations. The 
latest developments in regards to the Basque pro-independence terrorist group ETA and 
strong regional support for nationalist parties indicates that now may be the perfect time 
to open up the talks for negotiations on a new position of the Basque country in regards 
to the Spanish State.  
Geography of the Basque Country 
The Basque country, known as “Euskal Herria” in the Basque language, consists 
of the seven historic provinces that are part of both France and Spain. They were 
officially separated into France and Spain respectively in 1512. The four provinces of 
Euskal Herria that lie within Spanish territory are Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Araba, and 
Nafarroa. Nafarroa forms its own province within Spain, as well as a distinct autonomous 
community, the capital of which is Pamplona, or “Iruñea” in Euskara. The other three 
provinces, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, and Araba, form the region in Spain called País Vasco and 
another one of the four autonomous communities in Spain. The capital of País Vasco is 
Vitoria, or Gasteiz in Euskara. Despite the literal translation of País Vasco from Spanish 
to English as the “Basque country” it is important to remember that Basques themselves 
see the Basque country as the original seven provinces, which to this day remain united 
through various cultural practices and the Basque language (though of varying dialects). 
So, while the Spanish autonomous community of País Vasco includes only four 
provinces of the Basque country, Euskal Herria refers to all seven historically Basque 
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provinces. In addition to the four Spanish Basque provinces, the three provinces in 
France that complete Euskal Herria are Lapurdi, Nafarroa Beherea, and Zuberoa.  
It might seem natural that many people, when hearing that a person is Basque, ask 
whether they are French or Spanish Basque, but this distinction is divisive in the eyes of 
the Basque people. It does not have an appropriate answer because they are simply 
Basque. This is a testament to the cultural and social unity that remains today within 
Euskal Herria, despite the political differences and geopolitical boundaries. A more 
appropriate question to ask a person from Euskal Herria would be to ask their residence. 
It will often be answered with the response of either “Hegoalde” or “Iparralde”. Hegoalde 
is the Basque word referring to the four Basque provinces of Spain and means the 
“Southern side”. Iparralde is the term for the “northern side” of the Basque country, 
which includes the three Basque Provinces in France.  
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Figure 1: Map of the Basque country
 
 
Through this geographical explanation of the Basque country, we see that what the 
Basque country really is depends on whom you are asking. Politically, it gets even more 
interesting. The term “Euskadi”, like País Vasco is given to refer to the three Basque 
provinces of Spain that make up the Communidad Autonoma Vasca (Basque 
Autonomous Community), but it has a political connotation that goes along with it. It 
refers to them through the lens that they are politically distinct from the three provinces 
of Iparralde and Nafarroa, a distinction that has been made because of the desire to push 
within the Spanish government for a sovereignty vote for the province of País Vasco.  
	  	  	   5 
 All the geographic complexity and the convoluted definitions beg one to discover 
the origins of the current Basque nation. I use the term nation, because the Basque people, 
while clearly not fitting the modern definition of a “state” or a “nation-state”, clearly 
fulfill the requirements of a nation. They are a large aggregate of people (numbering 2.9 
million people of whom 650,000 are euskaldunak, or Basque speakers) who share a 
common descent, history, language, culture, and sense of identity.4 So how did this nation 
that lived from the tenth to the sixteenth century as essentially one kingdom with a loose 
form of unity become separated and absorbed into 2 distinct nation-states? The answer 
does not lie in a lack of cultural strength or unification of the Basque people, but rather 
the political organization of the time. 
Euskal Herria on the Eve of Separation 
Euskal Herria endured centuries of domination by encroaching neighbors, but its 
early history was actually marked by a large degree of self-rule. The distant history of the 
Basques is quite controversial, and their origins have yet to be proven, but by the time of 
their first documented subjugation to a foreign power they were already a unique and 
distinct group. This was likely due in part to the geography of the region, which was 
unfertile and mountainous, and thus unappealing to outsiders, and its distance from the 
Mediterranean, which was the focus of the Roman Empire’s conquest. The Roman 
Empire, nevertheless, was the first to conquer Basque land and their domination lasted 
from the 1st century B.C. to the 5th.5 Their method of rule allowed for continued self-
government, however, as the political organization was very relaxed, which allowed the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Basque Language-Hispanic Studies-University of Birmingham, 2014, accessed February 26, 2014, 
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/lcahm/departments/hispanic/about/basque/language.aspx. 
5 Mikel Sorauren, Historia De Navarra, El Estado Vasco (Pamplona: Pamiela, 1999). 
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Basque people to retain their traditional leadership and laws. Upon the collapse of the 
Roman Empire, Germanic tribes known as the Visigoths, and the Franks claimed land in 
the Basque country as well and fought multiple battles to gain control.  
The Visigoths established feudalism in the Basque country, and out of it grew a 
noble class through land consolidation. This period marked the only real time in early 
history that Basque self-government was drastically limited, and even still this period was 
brief. When the rest of Spain was experiencing greater degrees of domination under the 
Kingdom of Castile in Southern Spain, the Basques were experiencing a return of self-
rule in the Kingdom of Navarra.6 Though the Kingdom of Castile managed to seize 
Basque territory in 1512 from the Kingdom of Navarra (which became confined to 
approximately the location of today’s province of Navarra), the seized provinces, Bizkaia, 
Araba, and Gipuzkoa, were still permitted to retain much of their autonomy and rights 
that they had when part of the Kingdom of Navarra.  These rights were contained in a 
series of charters known as fueros, which the King swore to uphold. In the creation of 
these fueros, the King also promised that all future kings of Castile (and later Spain) 
would swear to uphold this oath as well.7 These fueros, known as the Foral system, is part 
of why Basques today still feel as though they have a distinct position or status in Spanish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 According to legend, the Kingdom formed officially when Basque leader/chieftain Iñigo Arista was 
elected King of Pamplona, and led a revolt in 824 against the regional Frankish authority, which had gained 
power of Pamplona in 806 and 812. This demonstrates early on a history of democracy among the Basques. 
A very detailed history of Navarra can be read in Gregorio Monreal Zía and Roldán Jimeno 
Aranguren, Conquista E Incorporación Del Reino De Navarra a Castilla (Pamplona-Iruña: Pamiela, 2012). 
7 This process consisted of the Monarch travelling to Guernica and swearing loyalty to the fueros 
underneath an oak tree known as “The Great Oak”, which had been the traditional location of assembly for 
local governance in early history. The historic tree died in 2004 and was felled the following year. Cameron 
Watson, "Basque Political Autonomy" (lecture, USAC Guest Lecturer, San Telmo Museum, San Sebastian, 
Spain, June 13, 2013). 
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society. The great historical impact of the Foral system has been retained today in 
different minor elements of the Spanish political system.8 
The division of the Basque country into France and Spain officially came in 1513 
with the Castilian conquest of Upper Navarra. The Northern provinces of Iparralde 
retained their independence until they were joined with France by way of “personal union” 
in 1589 when King Henry III of Navarre inherited the French throne as Henry IV of 
France, and in 1620 it was merged into the Kingdom of France.9 A final international 
border was established between the French and Spanish crowns once and for all in 1659 
with the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrennes.10 After a series of wars both internally and 
through fighting off the various invaders, most notably the Moors, the modern Spanish 
state formed around various peoples who had Christianity in common.11 Today Spain 
reflects this diversity in its many various groups with distinct language and cultural 
practices, of whom the Basques are just one. This history also makes it clear that the 
Basque sense of identity predates the modern state system.  
The Legacy of the Foral System 
From the time the Basque country was absorbed into France and Spain, until well 
into the 18th century, all seven provinces had created economic networks of trade and 
exchange with each other.12 The agricultural farmstead was a typical home for the 
majority of Basque people and operated as a miniature socioeconomic unit. For this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 One example of this is the name of the province of Nafarroa, which in Spanish is officially called the 
“Communidad Foral de Navarra”.  
9 "Iparralde: "North-side" of the Basque Country," North American Basque Organizations, Inc., accessed 
April 06, 2014, http://www.nabasque.org/iparralde.html. 
10 Cameron Watson, Modern Basque History: Eighteenth Century to the Present, 42  
11 Cameron Watson, "Basque Political Autonomy" (lecture). 
12 Ibid. 
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reason, little need for a cash income existed, and trade was conducted between families 
and across greater regions out of mutual need. One example of this was the exchange of 
pigs from Nafarroa Beherea and the cheeses of Zuberoa for the wheat, wine, and olive oil 
of Nafarroa.13 Special rights appointed to those in Hegoalde and to an extent Iparralde, as 
part of the fueros system and carried over through assimilation, included the status of a 
tax-free zone at the borders of Euskal Herria.14 This historical background is in part the 
reason why the Basque Autonomous Region and Navarra enjoy more fiscal autonomy 
than the other regions of Spain today. 
 The foral system was established throughout the dominions of the Kingdom of 
Castile as a necessary way to maintain peace between the central political authority in 
Madrid, and the diverse local populations that were consolidated under its control. For 
the Basque people, these fueros were even more important because they had been their 
form of governance under the Kingdom of Nafarroa, even though at the time they were 
merely orally kept laws, and not written down.  
A key aspect to the foral system, that existed first in Hegoalde and later Iparralde, 
were the local councils, known as “juntas”, “cortes”, or “hermandades” within 
Hegoalde.15 These councils exercised a great deal of authority and even acted as a check 
on the central authority in Madrid at times. The juntas retained the right to veto laws 
made by the crown, the process called the “pase foral”.  
Another aspect of the fueros that distinctly applied to the Basque people though in 
varying degrees is what is known as “collective nobility”. One-sixth of the Basques in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid. 
14 Cameron Watson, Modern Basque History: Eighteenth Century to the Present, 37. 
15 Historically, these juntas had existed as democratic, open forums. The word fuero comes from this 
history and the Spanish word “afuera”, meaning “outside.” Cameron Watson, Modern Basque History: 
Eighteenth Century to the Present, 37. 
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Nafarroa Beherea, one-eighth of those in Araba, and all in both Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa 
received “noble” status.16 What this meant was a guarantee of property and land rights, 
and in Zuberoa, it even specified that all inhabitants of the province were “free, of free 
condition, and with no trace of servitude”.17 This provision meant that gaining freedom 
from feudal servitude was significantly easier for Basques than it was for those in other 
parts of the Kingdoms of Spain or France. Another provision of one of the various fueros 
agreements that was unique to the Basques was their exemption from military service 
outside of the Basque country. 
Many of these fueros, or at least aspects of them, have remained today in the 
statute system that outlines the rights of the Basque Autonomous Region and political 
organization to the rest of Spain and the Central Government.18 The process of political 
assembly to discuss the fueros and their special application is also likely to be part of why 
Basques have been more politically inclined throughout history than many of the other 
distinct cultural groups that came under the control of Spain. Nevertheless, there are 
certain powers, such as the traditional right of the juntas to veto crown laws, which do not 
have modern day equivalents in the Basque Autonomy Statute that governs the region 
today.  
Economic Development and a Demographic Shift 
While the Basque region had been of only minor economic importance before the 
18th century, a sort of pre-industrialization actually began as early as the 15th century with 
the iron ore production in Bilbao. Over time, this industry led the city to be renown 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid, 42.  
17 Ibid, 42. 
18 Cameron Watson, "Basque Political Autonomy" (lecture) 
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throughout Europe for the “manufacture of arms, agricultural implements and 
shipbuilding materials such as anchors and chains”.19 Bilbao also served as an excellent 
location for a port with its navigable ocean inlet and made a very convenient channel for 
the wheat producing regions of Castile to the larger world market. It was an especially 
well positioned port because it was accessible all year long due to the moderate climate. 
This kind of industrial expansion was spurred on in part by the fueros that established 
Euskal Herria as a free-trade area. Other countries began to invest in Bilbao, which 
enhanced the speed of the industrial boom in the Basque country and gave Bilbao an 
economic importance that it had not previously known.20 Where it had been used as a 
port for simple import and export of goods, it now had heavy industrial strength behind 
it.21  
There was an issue with this boom, however. It required labor to sustain itself and 
money continuously needed to be reinvested. Luckily, many of the wealthier merchant 
families would reinvest their profits back into the local economy in the form of secondary 
and tertiary industries. But, these industries too demanded an increased number of 
workers. This eventually led to the migration of people to the Basque country to work in 
such industries. Initially they came from the North of Spain, and then increasingly from 
further and further south. This was one of the first steps in a major demographic change 
within Euskal Herria that would be complemented by the major exodus of Basque 
peoples in the Franco years that were yet to come.22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid, 17. 
20 Cameron Watson, "Basque Political Autonomy" (lecture). 
21 Biarritz in France was another major city, although its success centered on Maritime industries, 
exploration, whaling, and shipbuilding. Basques actually became world-renown for their knowledge of 
ships and sailing and made up the majority of Columbus’ crew when he sailed to the new world.  
22 Cameron Watson, "Basque Political Autonomy" (lecture). 
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While proto-industrial development began early, the takeoff experienced in the 
late nineteenth and early 20th centuries was almost unprecedented anywhere in Europe.23 
Lapurdi and Nafarroa Beherea, like Bizkaia, had access to iron-ore deposits though not to 
the same extent as Bilbao. In the early 1900s, these regions took off due to the production 
of railroad sleepers and cement.24 The fishing industry that had been waning in Lapurdi 
under industrialization was revitalized in the early 20th century through modernizing and 
expanding industry. Cheap labor, a population increase, and the introduction of electricity 
helped enhance the takeoff of the industrial revolution throughout the Basque country.25 
 While the urban cities were growing at a rapid pace, the interior provinces of 
Euskal Herria remained economically stagnant, continuing their agricultural industry. It 
was much harder for these interior regions to embrace industrialization.26 The majority 
population of Euskal Herria was made up of peasants and small farmers and their 
economy remained tied to the land. For them an industrial revolution did not occur until 
the 1950s and 60’s. During this time, the population actually declined in Nafarroa, 
despite the huge increase in population along the coast. This led to a divergent Basque 
experience and a deepening social division. Industrialization in the maritime cities played 
an important role in the reshaping of Basque society, which in turn led to the creation of a 
political and cultural reality that altered the daily lives of the Basques in the area. In 
contrast, the Basques who were located more rurally (even if that meant only several 
kilometers outside of the city) struggled to maintain their lifestyle built on Basque 
traditional practices and an agricultural economy in which the family unit is the mode of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Cameron Watson, Modern Basque History: Eighteenth Century to the Present 118. 
24 Ibid,123. 
25 Ibid, 122. 
26 Ibid, 124. 
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production. This stark contrast in many ways can still be seen in the areas surrounding the 
coastal cities today and we can now see how the economic changes that inevitably led to 
social and political changes presented a significant opposition to the stable fueros system 
that had been in place for around 300 years.27 It is important as well for explaining the 
origins of the ideological differences between the coastal provinces and Nafarroa and 
Alava, and which later influenced the provinces decisions to choose the sides they did in 
the Spanish Civil War, with Nafarroa and Alava supporting the monarchists, and Bizkaia 
and Gipuzkoa on the side of the Republicans.  
Cultural Assertion and Subsequent Repression 
While socio-economic shifts were occurring so too were some major socio-
political changes. The ideas of the French Revolution and Enlightenment thinking 
reached the Basque country and took hold of a large portion of the population at the close 
of the 18th century.28 The influenced areas were concentrated more on the coast, in parts 
of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa because industrial development had led to a general acceptance 
in those specific areas of modernizing trends, and because the ascension of the middle 
class meant there was a wide base from which Enlightenment ideals could be well 
received.29 This was especially so because the middle class felt deserving of a political 
influence that matched what they had gained in economic influence.  
 The effects of Enlightenment thought and the French Revolution led to various 
influential societies focusing their attention on maintaining their Basque ties. General 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Cameron Watson, "Basque Political Autonomy" (lecture). 
28 The goal of The Enlightenment was to reform society through reason, challenging the ideas of religion 
and faith, and creating a sense of nationalism. The French Revolution emerged from Enlightenment ideals 
as a reaction to state oppression/inadequacy (See Watson, 48). 
29 Cameron Watson, Modern Basque History: Eighteenth Century to the Present, 163. 
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thinking, at least along the coast, became about asserting Basque cultural uniqueness 
rather than adhering to the ecclesiastical authority that diminished it. While the French 
Revolution proved successful in overthrowing the Monarchy in France, Spain’s response 
to these events and the growing sense of Enlightenment fervor in the Basque country, 
was a return to Old Regime era politics and even further political centralization of Spain. 
The central authority in Madrid began to undermine Basque foral rights. Taxes were 
levied in a series of decrees in the 4 provinces of Hegoalde. 30  
 Bizkaia was one of the provinces to respond most forcefully to the change in the 
foral system and the result was an even larger crackdown. In 1804, a major protest in 
Bilbao ended in the forceful intervention of several thousand Spanish troops and the 
shipping off of leaders to colonial penal colonies.31  The following year, Madrid 
abolished the mayoralty of Bilbao and the “corregimiento”, the monarch’s administrative 
representative authority to the region. It was then placed under the control of a military 
commander, which served to advance the centralization of rule into the Basque 
heartland.32 Bizkaia had come under de facto Spanish military authority and the right of 
assembly in the province was abolished.  
The remainder of the century certainly fits the description of Basque history as a 
continuous effort to ward off what Robert P. Clark puts as, “the next threat to the freedom 
of the Basque provinces”.33 The beginning of the 19th century saw the invasion of 
Napoleon as well as his defeat, the return of the Monarchy and the absolutist reign of 
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Fernando VII, its subsequent fall, and the first of the Carlist Wars.34 The Basque foral 
system was still intact at this time, albeit barely, and Basque politics and support, 
especially in the First Carlist War, backed whichever side gave them the most chance of 
maintaining the foral system.35 Interestingly enough, as Cameron Watson describes, the 
significance of this period, and again especially the first Carlist War, was that the 
opposition to centralizing initiatives “[G]ave rise to a means of expressing specifically 
Basque grievances.”36  
The Basque foral system was largely dismantled after the failure of the Carlists to 
win the First Carlist War. This led to gradual incorporation of Basque provinces into the 
Spanish state in both the political and administrative realms, and the end of the “pase 
foral”.37 In the second half of the 19th century, progressive sectors of society seized the 
government and attempted a first republic, but major conservative opposition led to the 
Second Carlist War from 1872-1876, which was fought largely on conservative and 
religious principles.38 
The beginning of the 19th century was characterized by disorganization in the 
political arena and attempts at centralization.  After the second Carlist War was won by 
the liberal and military alliance of Madrid, a new political system was created with 
Alfonso XII as the monarch and a two-party political system.39 Things for Madrid were 
not good though, as it was engaged in a colonial war against the United States, and was 
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struggling to maintain its overseas empire. The “image” it had managed to create of a 
model liberal state with a two-party democracy and constitutional monarchy was not 
enough to hold the political system together. In reality it was riddled with corruption that 
was only barely masked and the system began to gradually breakdown. Social discontent 
among the peasantry of Spain was high, although the Basque country was actually 
prospering thanks to an industrial boom. However, the biggest challenge Spain faced, 
especially in regards to the Basques, was its inability to create or maintain a sense of 
Spanish nationalism in a state with so many distinct national identity lines. The failure of 
the attempt at a republic became inevitable and known internationally, as Spain’s 
colonies disappeared and the country descended into military rule in 1923. 
The Emergence of Basque Nationalism and Identity 
As outlined above, there was a massive influx of immigrants into Euskal Herria 
during the industrial revolution and throughout the areas economic success in the 19th 
century. As a result of so much diversity entering the traditional Basque territory, and 
because of the impact of industry fostering a need to speak Spanish in a commercial 
economy, the use of Euskara was in decline. For these reasons, and partially in opposition 
to the socialism that was growing out of this “foreign” working class, the political 
existence of a Basque nationalist sense began to emerge. Some of the factors that have 
been listed as origins for Basque nationalism, and that are important to reflect on, are 
given by José Luis del la Granja Sainz and presented in Cameron Watson’s book Modern 
Basque History: 18th Century to the Present and are as follows: 
1. “Remote precursors. Between the 15th and 19th centuries, 
several writers constructed historical myths claiming a distinct 
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or unique quality to Basque culture. The elements of this myth 
making varied from mysticism associated with the Basque 
language to ruralism and egalitarianism as essential aspects of 
Basque culture, and an original Basque independence… 
2. Nineteenth-Century Antecedents. During the nineteenth century, 
three general ideas greatly influenced the emergence of Basque 
nationalism: Romanticism, foralism, and Carlism. Building on 
an already established invented tradition, Romantic writers of 
the 19th century centered notions of Basque difference of the 
possession of the foruak. A foralist ideology… emerged at 
about the same time as Spanish liberalism’s first attempts to 
create modern Spain. We might conclude that foralism 
appeared as a kind of original response to proto-state building, 
in Spain, just as Basque nationalism later emerged during the 
initial stages of the modern liberal Spanish state. The clash of 
Carlism and liberalism was physically played out in the two 
Carlist wars of the 19th century… 
3. The Industrial Revolution. As we’ve seen, the social and 
cultural changes wrought by the economic changes of the late 
19th century profoundly altered Basque society, at a pace that 
was violently swift by any standard. In the space of a 
generation, Hegoalde–more specifically Bizkaia/Bilbao and to a 
lesser extent certain areas of Gipuzkoa–were transformed from 
a generally homogeneous (socially and culturally speaking) to a 
profoundly plural society. Whereas the two variants of Spanish 
nationalism both fed off industrial progress…Basque 
nationalism initially came to represent the reactionary clamor 
against industrial modernity”.40 
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We see through this analysis that there were many components that contributed to the rise 
of Basque nationalism. Some of these components were modern, but others had been 
deeply rooted in Basque culture even before the modern Spanish state existed. The foral 
system, for example, played an even greater role in Basque history than is limited to the 
times in which it was in place – its effect was path-dependent, one might say.41 Even 
when the foral system had long since been abolished it was remembered in Euskal Herria 
as evidence of a time of more autonomy whilst still under the Spanish crown. For this 
reason, its legacy existed long after and in fact served as a symbol for Basque nationalism. 
Cameron Watson demonstrates this connection with the example of “La Asociación 
Euskara de Navarra (Basque Association of Nafarroa) created by activists who wished to 
promote Basque cultural unity as a means of regaining the foruak”.42 Some of its many 
activities included a gathering in which folklore would be told and promoted to enhance 
the sense of a Basque cultural unity. This kind of organizational success was an immense 
leap up from the disorganization of the Basque people at the onset of Spanish conquest.  
 One of the main catalysts for Basque nationalism was, in part at least, late-modern 
Spanish nationalism itself. Attempts to imprint a Spanish national identity on the Basques 
and the other minority groups of the country only intensified the Basques’ resolve to 
display their unique culture and sense of identity. One individual in particular became 
known as the founder of Basque nationalism, Sabino de Arana y Goiri.43 Arana based 
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Basque nationalist ideology on six components, race, language, religion, the union of all 
Basques, non-violent means, and original independence.44  
 Sabino saw the role of Catholicism as paramount to the Basque nationalist 
movement and actually valued connection to the church as more desirable than even 
independence. His emphasis on the union of all Basques was important for parts one and 
two of his nationalist ideology, race and language, because it meant he needed to view 
Euzkadi as all seven of the traditional Basque provinces.45 Race as another factor is more 
controversial and in many ways Basque nationalism had a xenophobic element in its 
origins that could without doubt be attributed to the massive levels of immigration that 
occurred to the Basque country. Medical surveys have confirmed this racial distinction to 
an extent, which reveal that Basques have an extraordinarily high incidence of Rh-
negative factor blood.46 Language was the key distinct, defining aspect of Basque 
nationalism. This was partially because physiognomic characteristics of Basques that 
marked them as truly unique were (and are even more so now) hard to find. Thus, Arana 
fell back on language as the key racial distinction.47  
Arana believed that the struggle for separation should be nonviolent and should 
follow parliamentary tactics if possible.48 He had great faith in the workings of the 
democratic process and believed too that, “If Basques could only learn of their history, 
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pledged to protect these things, then Basque nationalism would triumph at the ballot box, 
and in the parliament”.49 Arana did not have a clear plan for what the Republic of 
Euzkadi would look like when it gained independence but clearly, one of the main 
objectives of Basque people was a return to the earlier state of autonomy they had 
achieved under the fueros. In 1895, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist 
Party) was founded by Arana Goiri, as a highly Catholic, conservative political party.50 
The party’s main objectives were to advocate for the restoration of self-government and 
the “Basque race”. At the beginning, the party made it a requirement that its members 
prove Basque ancestry by having a minimum number of Basque surnames. As Robert P. 
Clark explains, “From this assertion [of the importance of Race]... Sabino concluded that 
each racial type deserved to rule itself, and to establish its own particular political order. 
Non-Basques were not to be allowed to settle in Euskadi or to be employed there; and 
Basques were to be encouraged to marry within their race”.51  
 Robert P. Clark claims nationalism in general has progressed beyond racial 
definitions, instead giving way to “ethnic distinctions,” meaning more culturally based 
factors and a feeling of “Basque-ness.”52 This was in part a necessity, however, given the 
decline in use of Euskara. Clark points to the Franco era fear and repression of Euskara as 
evidence, however, that it was still a formidable component of Basque nationalism.53 
Given these differing concepts of nationalism, it is not difficult to see why the Spanish 
and Basque views, of the “rightful” position of the Basques in relation to Spain, are so 
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different. The Spanish government did not condone the prevalent use of Euskara, let 
alone the idea of a distinct Basque identity enhanced by Basque conceptions of 
nationalism. Madrid’s apparent failure to understand fully this division in the eyes of the 
Basques continues to be a detriment to the Spanish government’s ability to form a 
comprehensive and effective policy in regards to the Basque region’s political powers 
and rights.    
The Franco Years and the Emergence of E.T.A. 
The military dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera, which took power in 1923, 
suffered from a severe lack of direction. While Rivera had been a good general, he was a 
bad politician and in various ways alienated almost all sectors of society.54 It crumbled, 
and in its place came the establishment of the very progressive Second Republic. Under 
the republic, there would be universal suffrage without restrictions, meaning both women 
and men, and many other progressive tendencies. The Republic began on April 14, 1931, 
when Alfonso XII abdicated the throne as a result of monarchical forces continuing to fail 
in municipal elections.55 This Republic lasted for six years, and the Basque nationalists 
were very active politically in this time. In this period, Basque nationalists were 
committed to gaining independence without violence, but that required the legislature, 
known as the Cortes, to vote in favor of granting them that status. The PNV constituted 
the smallest number of seats in the Cortes during this time and could not manage to bring 
together enough political clout to effect this change. 
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In Spain in general, there were too many conservative powers, such as the Church 
and big landowners, who opposed the new radicalism of the Republic, and so began the 
Spanish Civil War.56 The war lasted from 1936 to 1939. Religious and economic issues 
came to the forefront and the provinces of Navarra and Alava feared the proletariat in San 
Sebastian and Bilbao, and thus abandoned the nationalist cause.57 When the Spanish Civil 
War reached the Basque country, Bilbao and San Sebastián declared themselves in 
defense of the Republic, and the Carlist supporters of Navarra and Alava left those 
provinces claiming staunchly anti-republican positions.58 General Emilio Mola had been 
relocated and stationed to control the army garrison in Pamplona, but this chance 
relocation put him in the perfect position for his dissident units of the Spanish army to get 
a foothold in an area with strongly negative feelings towards the regime.59 
 In the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, where the Basque Nationalist Party 
(PNV) was the most dominant political force, support came down on the side of the 
Republic, because it was believed to be the side that would give the Basques the most 
chance of regional autonomy (at the start of the Spanish Civil War the Statute of 
Autonomy had still not passed through the Cortes). Unfortunately, it would be the losing 
side of this battle, with Generals Sanjuro, Mola, and Franco leading the rebellion to an 
ultimate victory in 1939.60 The war slowly progressed with the fall of one city after 
another in the Basque provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa. In Navarra and Alava, 
anyone suspected of sympathizing with Basque nationalism or the Republic were tracked 
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down and imprisoned or executed without due process.61 The same was true however for 
those captured by the “Defense Committee of the Popular Front”, which was an 
amalgamation of left political parties and labor unions that ruled the streets of San 
Sebastian in the early days of the War, before the PNV got a handle on the situation.62 
The Defense Committee practiced this same, indiscriminate violence to anyone who was 
believed to sympathize with the rebels.   
 The border city (between France and Spain) of Irun was struck first by General 
Mola’s troops and quickly fell, followed by the provincial capital city of San Sebastian 
on September 13th, 1936. It too, was easily taken by the rebels whose equipment 
consisted of vastly superior tanks and armored cars.63 With the fall of San Sebastian, 
civilians began retreating to Bilbao where it was believed the Basque resistance would be 
stronger.  In the wake of each fallen city, anarchists set fire to the Basque towns.  The 
Basques did manage to put up quite a fight and by September, had managed to throw 
several thousand infantry battalions together, which eventually were supplied ironically 
enough, with weapons purchased from Germany.  
 In October, the Spanish Cortes, which was meeting in Valencia, because Madrid 
had been besieged, voted to approve the Autonomy Statute, which had been delayed in 
July when the rebellion broke out. The Basque nationalists soon realized however, that 
the Republic felt “little obligation to extend aid to the new constituent republic of 
“Euzkadi.”64 José Antonio de Aguirre, representing the PNV, became the first president 
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of Euzkadi, and the restoration of autonomy to the Basques was considered complete.65 
General Mola’s troops, however, were gaining strength thanks to the help and 
reinforcement of Italian and Moorish troops and German aircraft. The focus shifted from 
October 1936 to March 1937 to Madrid due to the winter weather, but as spring came 
back around, Mola and Franco concluded Bilbao must be taken swiftly so as to restore 
momentum to the rebellion, and to secure the city’s valuable iron ore and industrial 
might.66 
 President Aguirre faced many problems in trying to organize before the spring 
offensive. There were far too few with actual professional military training, and political 
discontent, especially dissident political leaders, meant battalions would withdraw from 
crucial battles as a way of displaying their discontent with Aguirre’s policies.67 The 
Basque nationalists had barely any arms and equipment and a blockade in the Bay of 
Biscay by the rebel navy made this even more problematic. They were simply 
underequipped, so Aguirre tried to combat this issue by launching the construction of the 
famous “Belt of Iron” which aimed to encircle Bilbao with a network of fortifications that 
included barbed wire, trenches, and concrete machine gun bunkers.68 Clark mentions that 
this sort of defense likely lured the Basques into a false sense of security, when in reality 
there were major gaps in the fortifications and the whole defense lacked depth (the 
construction of multiple lines). All these issues were magnified when the engineer officer 
of the Belt, Captain Goicoechea, deserted the Basque cause and gave up all his 
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knowledge of it to the rebels.69 The belt also had a major weakness, in that it lacked any 
capacity to defend against aerial bombardment. 
 Franco and Mola had enlisted the help of the Germans, and German pilots began 
to drop bombs, in part for the purpose of testing the effects of their new incendiary bomb 
technology, on civilian populated towns. First, they dropped them on the town of 
Durango, which was strategically located on the way to Bilbao, and second, on the town 
of Guernica, which had always been of historical, political and cultural significance to the 
Basques. According to Clark, these bombings were “the first time in the history of 
warfare that a civilian population had been attacked from the air for other than military 
reasons”.70 Guernica had a population of 7,000 and had even more on the day it was 
attacked since it was the weekly market gathering where farmers from out of town 
journeyed in to sell their produce. Guernica has since become associated with the 
atrocities of war, as German fighters and bombers dropped both explosives and 
incendiary bombs, and unleashed machine gunfire on the fleeing population.71 
Franco’s goal was to create a homogenous, authoritarian and modern, Spanish 
state. This meant specifically targeting the strong ethnic and racial minorities and in 
particular those that had caused difficulty in the Spanish Civil war, i.e. the Basques. 
Franco was truly a dictator in all senses when it came to the Basque people and their 
culture. To understand the severity with which he began to oppress the Basques, there is a 
telling quote. General Gil Yuste, the Spanish military governor who was appointed to the 
Basque province of Araba, wrote during the Civil War, “These abominable separatists do 
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not deserve to have a homeland…Basque nationalism must be ruined, trampled underfoot, 
ripped out by its roots”.72 Towards the end of the war, all of Euskadi came under the 
control of Franco’s troops. As much as the Basques suffered before the fall of Bilbao, 
they suffered even more in the remaining years of the Spanish Civil War in which Franco 
had total control over Basque territory, and throughout the rest of his dictatorship.  
The origin of the modern conflict between Basque separatists and the Spanish 
government can be found in this time period. The Basques whom had managed to retreat 
to the port of Santoña after the fall of Bilbao in June 1937, awaited evacuation after 
surrender to the Italians, but their evacuation never came. After two days of waiting on 
loaded ships to embark as refugees to Britain, the Basques were ordered to disembark and 
at the orders of General Franco were transported in buses and other vehicles to 
concentration camps and to the local prison to await transfer to other prisons and forced 
labor battalions.73 Meanwhile, the Basques had formed a solid government in exile in 
Paris in 1937 and were protected by the sympathetic French government, which felt for 
the Basques under the oppressive Franco regime. Financially, it was supported by 
substantial contributions from exiled Basques in Latin American and Europe.74 
 Francisco Franco’s dictatorship operated under many of the theories of Spain’s 
previous dictator, Primo de Rivera.75 Rivera had seen regionalism, which fostered and 
favored separatism, as the biggest threat to the unity of Spain. Franco shared this belief 
and began a crusade of fierce repression of all minorities but especially the Basques, 
whom he saw as the most organized and largest threat due to their performance in the 	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early part of the Spanish Civil War. In 1937 Franco had full control of the Basque 
Provinces and began suppressing Basque liberties and culture immediately. He ordered a 
purge of all Basque nationalists across all four Basque Provinces.76 Property of known 
Basque nationalists was seized, including businesses and industrial centers like in Bilbao, 
and became hosts for weapons manufacturing to be used against the Basque people and 
the progressive Republic. Schoolmasters were fired from their jobs unless they could 
prove political neutrality and when the war had ended it only intensified.  
Robert P. Clark notes that the most damaging act of suppression symbolically was 
the attempt to destroy the Basque language. Euskera was prohibited in all public places 
and one could go to jail even for having a casual conversation in Euskera on the street.77 
Furthermore, entries of births, marriages, and deaths that included Basque names were 
erased from the civil registries and replaced with Spanish equivalents. Inscriptions on 
tombstones that were in Euskera were even scraped off in places. This suppression of 
Euskera was especially damaging because of the culture’s heavy reliance on oral 
literature as part of their major cultural practices, and as a means of identification of race 
and culture. Perhaps most egregious was the fact that for at least two months after the fall 
of Bilbao, “countless hundreds of innocent civilians were rounded up on the street by day, 
and in their homes at night, driven to remote country areas, or to deserted graveyards, and 
executed summarily, without even the benefit of having a priest hear their confession”.78 
At the outset of WWII, the Franco government gave German authorities (who had 
succeeded in their occupation of most of France) a list of 800 important exiles from the 
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Civil War, many of whom were Basque, and told them to apprehend and deport them to 
Spain.79 Many fled to what was called the “liberated zone” in the south which was still 
governed by French officials and many were captured and returned to Spain. Those who 
remained in Vichy were spared but many thousands of Basques who remained in France 
were harassed and persecuted. Some were deported to concentration camps in Germany, 
but more were placed in French concentration camps and characterized as a threat to the 
pro-Nazi Vichy regime. Those that were able to escape as refugees were often split up 
from their families and it was hard to find a government who would accept them. The 
United States, for example, denied admission to Basque and Spanish refugees 
uniformly.80 
  Resistance movements formed and continued to operate in the face of Franco’s 
repressive dictatorship. The Resistance Committee operated on the Spanish side of the 
border in conjunction with the Basque Consultative Council, which was comprised of 
representatives from the major Basque political parties, the PNV, the Basque Republican 
Left, and the Basque Nationalist Action, along with a few from the Basque arm of the 
Spanish Socialist Workers Party.81 The Council also worked closely with the important 
Basque union groups and was responsible for acting as a liaison between the Basque 
Government-in-Exile in Paris and the political forces, such as the Resistance Committee, 
on the Spanish side of the border. Every time the Committee organized any sort of 
activity, hundreds of Basques were swept up by Franco’s police forces and arrested, 
tortured, and left in prison without a trial for months at a time.82 	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 Another major tactic the Basque nationalists used were clandestine radio and 
newspapers that spread the word throughout the Basque region that the Euzkadi 
government was still alive and gaining strength. Meanwhile, Franco’s government’s 
response in this time was unwavering suppression and violence. When 250,000 workers 
struck in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa in 1951, the government responded with swift and 
intense action, arresting more than 2000 in the first 24 hours and issuing beatings and job 
dismissals far and wide.83 This strike fever actually spread to Alava and Navarra as well, 
but failed to take off in other parts of Spain, allowing Franco to concentrate all of his 
efforts on punishing the Basques.  
 As one might have predicted, however, these extreme acts of oppression 
provoked extreme responses and attitudes of resistance from the Basque people. Several 
positions emerged based on what people thought the resistance movement was really 
about. There were of course people who mainly viewed it as an economic struggle and 
joined prohibited Basque or Spanish unions, others who viewed it as principally political 
and supported the PNV, while still others believed the struggle to be about cultural 
repression and fought to preserve linguistic uniqueness and traditional practices.84 
However, generally the issue became the question of how best to rid themselves of 
Spanish domination. The PNV, which had continued to exist with a great degree of 
solidarity, believed in the approach of waiting for Franco’s demise while maintaining the 
vitality of Basque culture.85 While initially seeking the help of the great powers, it did not 
take very long for reality to set in that they would not do enough to drive Franco from 
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power. The PNV attempted to stay close with all of the anti-Franco underground 
movement groups in an effort to prepare the ground “for the emergence of a democratic 
political order in Spain once Franco was dead”.86 They believed in waiting for a 
democratic or parliamentary solution to Spain’s problems, because the issue was with the 
whole of Spain and not just within the Basque country, and therefore a major shift would 
occur towards a democratic end. Other Basque nationalists believed that a more radical or 
aggressive approach must be taken to obtain independence for the fatherland, aside from 
the problems that lie within Madrid. A great sense of political participation rose up. 
While it hadn’t been dormant before, it had been left to the hands of the more elite for 
more than 100 years, but in 1955, the PNV pushed that the duties of every citizen 
included attending PNV meetings and participating “[A]ctively in the gatherings, taking 
an active interest in the problems faced by the Party, and suggesting solutions to these 
obstacles.”87 The PNV was largely concerned with organizational matters, like raising 
money to support the resistance activities, but they also took on activities meant to 
preserve and strengthen various aspects of their culture, like music, art and folklore. For 
example, the PNV supported clandestine Basque language schools and aimed to send the 
message that “the continuation of Spanish domination was futile, for the strength of 
Basque culture would prevail, just as it had prevailed in earlier, less complicated times.”88 
While the PNV took to working the political system and doing what they could to 
preserve Basque culture, another group emerged that favored the approach demanding 
action be taken in order to gain Basque independence.  
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Euzkadi ta Askatasuna 
Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (“Basque Homeland and Freedom) is the Basque terrorist 
organization that has been fighting for an independent Basque country since its creation 
in 1959. It grew out of a student group that found its origins in 1952 because of 
frustration with the conservative policies of the PNV. The first several years were merely 
directed at “mutual education [rather than] at taking steps to achieve independence” since 
they realized their lack of experience with political action.89 They quickly grew however, 
and merged with more small groups of young people and eventually took the name “Ekin” 
after a mimeographed newsletter they had begun to publish.90 From 1954-1957 Ekin 
grew in strength and was invited to join with the youth section of the PNV, called EGI 
(Euzko Caztedi, “Basque Youth”). They did so, however, within two years, split off again 
because of differences in ideology. The Ekin youth believed the PNV leadership was 
cowardly and had deep-seated resistance to political change, while the PNV believed the 
Ekin group lacked patience.91 Their break led to the founding of ETA, on July 31st 
1959.92  
 Quickly, the group’s strategies turned violent, drawing on precedents such as the 
terror unleashed during the Napoleonic War and the bombing of Guernica during the 
Spanish Civil War. ETA’s members were primarily from working class families and 
students and on July 18th 1961, ETA attempted its first act of sabotage on a number of 
trains carrying Franco supporters to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the military uprising 
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that began the Civil War.93 Their intention was to derail the cars without hurting anyone, 
but they were unable to even derail them due to the placement of their devices. Still, the 
Spanish government reacted strongly. Over 100 people were arrested and tortured and 
about 30 were taken to prison for interrogation, then sent to exile or jail for 15-20 years.94 
This only increased ETA’s commitment towards the direction of guerilla tactics in the 
1960’s as a way to advance their quest for an independent Basque country. Money and 
psychological impact in this time were the central tenants of their strategy and were 
aimed at avoiding even more disastrous countermeasures from the Spanish government.95 
The earliest death in the Spanish Civil Guard-ETA cycle of violence, while 
somewhat inconsistent from source to source, was Civil Guard José Pardines and ETA 
member Javier Echebarrieta in 1968 during a shootout in Gipuzkoa.96 Echebarrieta 
became a martyr for ETA’s cause and helped grow their ranks. ETA responded with the 
assassination of Commissioner Meliton Manzanas in Burgos: the action that is most often 
cited to be the first planned attack by either side. It is also important to note that there 
were many different breaks within the organization, starting as early as 1967, because 
many did not agree with the violent tactics the group was using.97 These breaks might 
well have been why ETA had little success during the Franco years.  
Franco’s death in 1975 marked the start of Spain’s transition to democracy. The 
Monarchy was restored and King Juan Carlos, the current King of Spain, was named to 
the throne. ETA’s violent actions continued and the group killed the mayor of the Basque 
town Oyarzún for allegedly being a “police informer” on November 24, 1975, just 4 days 	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after Franco’s death and two days after Juan Carlos was named King.98 Despite this 
attack, the next day King Juan Carlos proclaimed a general amnesty for nearly all of 
Spain’s political prisoners, and a reduction of prison terms for those that remained.99 It 
was expected that about 15,000 common criminals and political prisoners would benefit 
from the amnesty. In just three days, around 250 prisoners had already been freed. Even 
as ETA incidents continued, the amnesty moved forward and in February of 1976, the 
government had released 6,500 prisoners.100 This transition period for the Spanish 
government marked yet another division in ETA, as a separate political arm was created 
distinct from the military arm of the organization. On July 30, 1976, King Juan Carlos’ 
amnesty was extended to all political prisoners except those sentenced for terrorist acts. 
This meant that between 400 and 500 of the 650 political prisoners would be freed 
immediately.101 As Franco’s reign of terror was finally seemingly over, it appeared the 
new King’s tactics might have almost been enough to appease the Basque terrorist group 
and commit them to purely democratic means of achieving their goals. Unfortunately, 
this did not come to be.  
More attempts were made by Juan Carlos to appease the Basque country’s 
political desires, though not without much prompting. País Vasco demanded regional 
autonomy, but after plans for such autonomy had been postponed, a paralyzing strike in 
Bilbao occurred and firefights between protestors and local police forces broke out.102 
Violence in the region continued and any favor granted to the Basques, such as the order 
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flag, the Ikurriña, were too little too late. More and more protestors took to the streets and 
in return police forces became increasingly oppressive. In 1976 many neo-Francoists and 
rightists called for a military seizure of power of the Basque region after the President of 
the Provincial Assembly of Guipúzcoa, Juan de Araluce, was machine gunned to death in 
the streets of San Sebastián in the middle of the day, in high traffic.103 Araluce had been a 
trusted advisor of King Juan Carlos. This act marked one of the most highly visible 
declines in public support for ETA since its founding.  
Creation of the Autonomous Communities 
In 1977, shortly after Franco’s death, the Basque Provinces, and subsequently 
Navarra, received pre-autonomy legal and administrative status and were officially 
granted status as an Autonomous Community in 1978.104  The Spanish government 
insisted that all autonomous regions would possess the same powers, resources and 
responsibilities during their transitional phase. There would also be rights that were 
consistent for all autonomous communities and define their operation, one of which being 
that the governments would consist of a “[P]opularly elected parliament, a president 
elected by the parliament, and a Supreme Tribunal of Justice. [It] will enjoy considerable 
financial autonomy, including the right to levy its own taxes and to charge for its services 
in its territory, as well as the power to charge for licenses and permits, and to receive 
income from the rent or other use of public property such as buildings or land”.105  In 
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contrast, the full establishment of an autonomous region would be specific to each case 
and individually negotiated by the parties involved.106  
Some elements of structure are important to note in regards to the autonomous 
communities and the Spanish Central government. One of the big distinctions created in 
the 1978 Constitution was between “Provinces” and the new “Autonomous 
Communities”. The term “province” implies nothing more than a transfer of 
administrative duties from Madrid to the region, while “autonomous community” 
includes transfer of limited sovereign powers.107 Of further importance, is that Spain’s 
democratic system resembles a model of devolution like that in Great Britain, not 
federalism like in the U.S. or Canada.108 This means that the Spanish government retains 
the right to alter or even withdraw “Autonomous Community” status under certain 
conditions. The decentralization and the devolution of powers to the regions occurred in 
part as a natural next step for the country. Spain had become a modern industrialized state 
with a population of more than 35 million people during Franco’s 36 year reign. Clark 
explains that as other industrial countries have discovered, many of the problems that 
come with modernization, such as urban congestion, low income housing, the need for 
health care and mass education, “cannot be resolved adequately if the central regime 
retains full control over policies that are nation-wide in scope”.109  
 The Autonomy Statute that was negotiated for the Basque country granted the 
Basque government exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting social security, health, 
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welfare, labor relations and working conditions, education, culture, communications 
media, environmental protection, and control over transportation and agricultural and 
fisheries.110 This meant that for the most part, the Basques would be able to have the 
freedom to govern themselves in both cultural and economic matters in the way they see 
fit, and that meet their specific needs as a group. Even more significant, for the first 
notable length of time since the foral system, the Basque Provinces were free to conduct 
their own affairs in an openly democratic system.  
The Basque General Council, born in part out of the continued issues with ETA, 
was tasked with managing the transition of the region to autonomy, though its creation 
was delayed for more than three months after the pre-autonomy decree had been 
issued.111 Despite delays in some areas, financial agreements needed to be negotiated and 
in 1980 the “conciertos económicos” established that the Basque region would levy and 
collect its own taxes as a region (rather than just provincially) that could be used how the 
regional government saw fit. Only a portion of the taxes would go to Madrid and it would 
be in lieu of payment of personal or corporate taxes directly to the Spanish 
government.112 Today, the Basque country pays 10% of its taxes to the Spanish 
government each year.113  
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With restrictions on Basque activities finally lifted, a revival of Basque culture 
took place. While the underground Basque language schools known as “ikastolas” had 
existed clandestinely throughout the decades, the Autonomy Statute allowed public 
schools to now offer classes in Euskara, which in turn generated hope of restoring 
Euskara to a modern, working language. According to Clark, polling evidence from the 
1978 referendum on the Spanish constitution even pointed in the direction that “Basque 
culture seems to be absorbing non-Basques, and converting Spaniards into Basque 
nationalists”.114 Despite all the political progress and a clear opening up to Basque 
cultural rights, ETA continued with its violent attacks. Instability in Madrid from both the 
political left and the right led to an aborted coup in 1981. The combination of these 
incidents caused Spain’s political elite to dramatically slow the process of 
decentralization.115 
ETA’s Bloodiest Years and Spain’s Counter-terrorism Policies 
When Franco died, ETA did not disband as one might have imagined, though the 
opportunity to peacefully do so was there. There were many actors who intervened at the 
outset of Spain’s transition to democracy in the conflict with ETA, to try and put an end 
to its armed activity. On the right, counter-terrorism and police tactics were implemented 
to try and subdue ETA’s commando units, while on the left, attempts at negotiation and 
conciliatory efforts tried to bring an air of diplomacy to the situation.116 The disjointed 
efforts probably counteracted each other, however, and all attempts continually failed, but 	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the Spanish government pressed on. One of the Spanish police’s major experts on ETA, 
Sainz Gonzalez, after arriving in Bilbao, announced that he wanted to establish a 
dialogue with the Basque insurgent group, recognizing that their issues were political and 
not necessarily a simple matter of law enforcement.117 Unfortunately, ETA was at first 
not interested and their obstinacy led to the creation of anti-terrorist laws that were 
shortly put into effect.  The government began to launch a series of counter-attacks 
against ETA with the mission of crushing the organization once and for all.118 Clark notes, 
“More than 50 experienced police officers were gathered together in Bilbao to form the 
nucleus of the anti-ETA strike force”.119 The force detained former ETA members for 
days at a time without charge, and raids captured and arrested more than 200 ETA 
members, all made legal through the new powers the forces had acquired from a cabinet 
decree. 
While the political prisoner count had fallen to practically zero by the end of 1977 
thanks to King Juan Carlos’ numerous amnesty decrees, it increased again with the 
crackdown and creation of the new counter-insurgency forces. By 1978, ETA members 
accounted for 111 of the 243 political prisoners in Spanish jails.120 Many families of 
prisoners were again concerned with torture, which there continued to be evidence of, 
though it was in no way carried out to the extent that it was under Franco. The biggest 
prisoner rights issue of the day, and the present day for that matter, was the government’s 
tendency to move prisoners from one jail to another without informing anyone. This 
practice actually began before the special counter-terrorism forces were established. One 	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example of it occurred in December of 1978, when 97 Basque prisoners were moved to 
the maximum-security prison at Soria because of an anticipated “mass escape” plan. 
While this sparked mass outrage at the Spanish government in Madrid, this period also 
marked a change in public opinion towards ETA.  
Generally speaking ETA’s violence was denounced, but it was largely believed to 
be isolated to political figures and the Guardia Civil in early years, which allowed some 
to be sympathetic to ETA’s cause.121 From 1978 onward, however, the escalating 
violence and number of civilian casualties made it harder and harder to justify ETA’s 
actions. The PNV went from mutually denouncing both the institutional violence caused 
by the Spanish police and Government, and ETA, to putting most of its criticism on ETA 
throughout the course of 1978. In March, the PNV communiqué read “The Basque 
Nationalist Party manifests its most energetic repudiation of such acts, considering them 
directly directed at the creation of a climate of political instability and evolution toward 
the liquidation of the incipient democracy in Euskadi”.122 One figure that illustrates the 
degree to which ETA’s violent activity spiked in this period is reported by Clark and 
states, “[O]nly 74 people had lost their lives to ETA attacks during the entire period 
between 1963 and 1977, nearly that many [60] were killed by ETA violence in only one 
year [1978]”.123 Clark’s book which is the source of these figures, was published in 1979, 
and he stated that based on the 50 to 60 deaths which had already been reported in the 
first 6 months of the year, it is likely that ETA will have its highest level of killing yet if 
figures are projected for the rest of the year.124 	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Clark was right. In 1980, ETA had its bloodiest year yet, killing 118 people.125 It 
seemed the progress made through Juan Carlos’ amnesty program and political 
decentralization had been largely undone by the group’s terrorist acts. The Spanish 
government, frustrated with ETA’s increasing use of violence and refusal to negotiate or 
enter into dialogue, reverted to more oppressive and violent tactics themselves, in order 
to gain control of the terrorist organization. The years of 1975-1981, and 1983-1987, 
were marked by the “dirty wars.”126 The second of these “wars” involved “Grupos 
Antiterroristas de Liberación”, antiterrorist liberation groups (known as GAL or also 
“death squads”), carrying out assassinations, kidnappings and torture on ETA members 
and many civilians.127 The GAL seemed to be able to operate on both sides of the 
French/Spanish border with ease and complete exemption from local authorities, carrying 
out assassinations in public places like cafés and bars. Many believed that the dirty war 
tactics would stop after the first war because of the general elections which yielded the 
first Socialist prime minister in decades, but the Interior Ministry remained in the hands 
of right-wing Franco supporters, and the dirty wars continued with a second round.128 
The support for ETA that had been consistently dwindling in the second half of the 1970s 
experienced a renewal of enthusiasm based on sympathy after the creation of GAL during 
the second of the dirty wars and its horrible tactics. This gave ETA the increased support 
among Basques it needed to remain active (albeit not without strong opposition by many), 	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as “Basque nationalists [now] believed that behind the shifting scenes of parliamentary 
democracy, the same Francoist fascist state apparatus was functioning as murderously 
and untouchably as ever.”129 
The Slow Dissent of ETA Activity 
In 1987, ETA committed one of their most heinous crimes ever, when they 
planted a bomb in the parking garage of a Barcelona supermarket and killed 21 people, 
and injured another 45.130 Eventually, the organization agreed to enter into discussions 
with the Spanish government. Ceasefires have been declared numerous times, in 1988, 
1989, 1996, 1998, 2006 and most recently in September 2010. While all earlier attempts 
fell through, the most recent one in 2010 is still in place.131 ETA’s separate factions pose 
one of the greatest obstacles to maintaining a ceasefire, as communication and agreement 
between all parties/factions is hard to maintain. During good times, there has been 
cooperation on both sides. One such example of this is the policy the Spanish government 
referred to as “reinsertion” (that existed during the second of the dirty wars), which 
allowed imprisoned ETA members, who were believed to have truly forsaken violence, to 
be released and free to rejoin society.132 Unfortunately, the other side of this was that in 
an attempt to ensure that ETA did not impede this reinsertion process, the decision was 
made to move imprisoned ETA members who had previously been imprisoned with the 
Basque country, to prisons throughout all of Spain, resulting in some being as far away 	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from their families as the Canary Islands.133 This action not only incited protest from 
ETA members but from community and family members across the Basque country as 
well, and marked another emergence of public political participation in the Basque 
country.  
Cooperation between both French and Spanish police forces and the Spanish Civil 
Guard, has resulted in the capture of many leading ETA figures and severely reduced the 
organization’s ability to carry out attacks. In 2002, French and Spanish forces managed to 
capture ETA’s military chief Juan Antonio Olarra Guridi in Bordeaux. In 2004, 22 senior 
ETA members were arrested in southwest France, and in 2005, ETA’s number two leader, 
Harriet Aguirre, was captured in Aurillac, France.134 In 2006, what looked like a 
permanent ceasefire occurred. A DVD message from ETA was sent to the Basque 
television network and was broadcast over Spanish television.135 Talks were officially 
opened between ETA and Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, and 
lasted for almost a year. The ceasefire collapsed, however, with the detonation of a car 
bomb in a parking building at the Madrid Barajas International Airport on the 30th of 
December.136 Three more captures of military chiefs occurred in 2008 and another in 
2009 and 2010, all in Southwest France. 
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Contemporary Situation: The Status of the Independence Movement 
The current prime minister of Spain is Mariano Rajoy of the conservative 
People’s Party, who was elected Dec. 21, 2011 after winning 44.6 percent of the votes.137 
The party has been able to form a majority government and is a center-right party that 
opposes increased devolution of powers to autonomous regions and vehemently objects 
to negotiations with ETA.138  Their major opposition party is the Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party (PSOE), which is a center-left party. The PP, in the wake of the economic 
crisis has done its best to try and ignore developments in independence movements in the 
regions and address first and foremost the immediacy of the economic crisis.139 Rajoy has 
diminished the issues (especially in regards to Catalan’s proposed referendum on 
independence) by taking a legalistic approach to what many know requires a political 
solution. But, this is no surprise; as author and journalist Giles Tremlett puts it, 
opposition to Eta is part of the genetic make-up of Spain's political right, and the current 
government of Mariano Rajoy.140 
  On the regional level, in the most recent Basque parliamentary elections (October 
21, 2012) the PNV secured a majority of the votes but the emergence of a new party that 
rose to second in the polls has caused expert analysts to describe the elections as a 
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“landmark”.141 Euskal Herria Bildu (EH Bildu) is the successor party of the outlawed 
Batasuna party, which was the political party representing ETA. However, unlike their 
predecessor, the party has outright and publicly condemned the use of violence for 
political ends.142 EH Bildu was created after the abertzale (Basque political left) parties 
of Eusko Alkartasuna, Aralar, Alternatiba, and many independents that had been part of 
Batasuna decided to merge into one.143 This was possible in part because of the absence 
of violence from ETA.  Because of the ceasefire declared in 2011, the region has been 
able to hold the first ever elections in which ETA wasn’t a looming factor, and yet a 
radical separatist party was still able to participate in the political arena.144 When ETA’s 
political arm was active, it never managed to secure more than 20% of the vote, but EH 
Bildu, as the coalition of the abertzale, managed to gain 26% of the votes in May 2011 at 
local elections, and in November 2011 on the national level (as the Aimur party) with 
24% of the votes.145 This suggests that the absence of ETA’s violent activity finally 
allowed for the coming together of all separatist supporters into a united party. This is a 
similar situation to Sinn Fein’s rise following the IRA’s permanent ceasefire in Northern 
Ireland. Additionally, the economic challenges of Europe and Spain in general, are 
garnering more newfound support in the Basque country for independence. 
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Table 1: Election Data from Basque Parliamentary Elections of 2012 
 
The PNV had several options to form a government including forming a minority 
government, or a majority with the help of either EH Bildu (yielding 48 of the seats total) 
or the PSE (yielding 43 seats).146  They chose to form a minority government to address 
the various aspects of their campaigns by forming alliances with different partners on 
each issue. This is important because it was chosen despite the fact that a minority 
government was less favorable than an alliance between the two nationalist parties (even 
if by just a few percentage points). This suggests that while the nationalist parties have 
common ground on many issues, they have enough differences that Lehendakari, Inigo 
Urkullu, felt it best to work with various parties on an issue-by-issue basis.147  	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With EH Bildu as the second largest party after the PNV since the October 
regional elections, nationalist parties account for two-thirds of the current Basque 
parliament. Nationalist parties generally take the position of increased autonomy or 
independence, whereas non-nationalist parties tend to emphasize the risks of autonomy 
and benefits of closer ties with Spain.148 For this reason, and given that a referendum on 
the actual question has been blocked at the national level, looking at the results of Basque 
parliamentary elections can be one of the best ways (though not without its shortcomings) 
to get an idea for what percentage of the voting population within the Basque region 
favors independence.149 Of course, there are other factors in the nationalist party 
platforms as well, but it is evident from their electoral manifestos, just how much 
emphasis is put where.  
The PNV’s 262-page long manifesto for the 2012 election was 33% economic 
issues, and just 11% policies having to do with nation building and self-government. In 
contrast, EH Bildu’s election manifesto contained only 13% material on economic issues, 
and devoted 20% of their manifesto to “the construction, maintenance, and development 
of Basque national identity and independence proposals”.150 They were the only party not 
to give top priority to addressing the economic issues. That they managed to garner 
24.7% of the vote, the second highest of any party, despite every other party making the 
economy their first priority is perhaps even more telling of Basque attitudes towards 
independence. 
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In sum, when looking at the total votes received by nationalist parties (PNV and 
EH Bildu) vs. the total votes received by the main non-nationalist parties (PP, PSE, and 
UPyD), it is possible to get an idea of what proportion of the population may be in favor 
of greater autonomy and/or independence, and opposed to closer ties with Spain. The two 
nationalist parties take a whopping 58.9% of the votes, and the non-nationalist parties, 
just 32.4% in total. While the nationalist parties have always garnered more votes than 
the non-nationalist ones, the difference in votes in the 2012 election was the highest it 
had been in two decades, at 250,000.151 Even so, it would be unlikely for Prime Minister 
Mariano Rajoy, or any other PM in Madrid to say that this constitutes enough reason to 
allow even consideration of further devolution of powers to the Basque Autonomous 
Region.  
 The last Lehendakari that was part of the PNV, Juan Jose Ibarretxe, proposed 
putting the question to a referendum in 2005. While the proposal for the plan made it all 
the way to the Spanish national parliament (only the Spanish central government can call 
a referendum, according to the constitution), it did so with only a 51% majority approval 
vote from within the Basque parliament itself.152 The “yeas” were primarily composed of 
PNV members and the members of the outlawed Batasuna party (then renamed/formed as 
the Euskal Herritarok party). The proposal for the plan, known as the “Ibarretxe plan”, 
was overwhelmingly shot down by both the PSOE and the PP at the national level, and 
deemed unconstitutional on a number of accounts, least of which was that the Spanish 
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constitution strictly prohibits secession and Ibarretxe’s plan called for a redefinition of 
the Basque country as “freely associated” with Spain.153 
 While the Prime Minister at the time, Zapatero of the PSOE, agreed to consider 
looking into revising the Basque region’s autonomy structure, he said a vote of 51% in 
the Basque parliament is insufficient for “[C]onstructing a new order of living 
together”.154 Zapatero followed this up by saying, “Let's seek 70 percent, 80 percent, 100 
percent [in approval]" to begin negotiations.155 If this is an indication of the threshold 
needed for discussions to begin, then prospects do not look good for the Basques. With 
the numbers from the last election as they are at only 58.9% total of the Basque country 
voting for nationalist groups, and as inconclusive as they are given that a specific answer 
on secession is prohibited from being asked, it is unlikely that the government in Madrid 
will give serious consideration to expanding the Basque region’s current scope of 
autonomy. Even if the historically more sympathetic PSOE party were in power instead 
of the more conservative PP, it is unlikely they would deem a 58.9% vote as sufficient for 
reworking relations between the Basque country and the central government, based on 
Zapatero’s previous comments. Perhaps if EH Bildu, running on an independence 
platform, can continue to remain in the number two spot, form a coalition government 
with the PNV, or even rise to the number one party in the region, the central government 
will see secession as a more “legitimate” wish of the Basque country. Of course, holding 
a referendum on the issue would solve this question as well, but the Spanish government 
is very unlikely to permit it; among other reasons, the secession of the Basque country 
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would be detrimental for Spain’s already suffering economy. That may explain in part, 
why the Spanish government has acted so strangely in the face of the latest 
announcement from ETA, that they are putting their weapons “beyond use”.  
ETA Today 
In September, 2010 ETA declared another ceasefire, and a year later on October 
20th, an unconditional end to armed activity.156 This declaration was followed up on the 
21st of February, 2012 with an announcement that ETA had put some of their arms 
“beyond use” with the help of an International Verification Committee.157 The IVC, is a 
group of former international politicians and diplomats.158 This cooperation from an 
outside party has been one of the biggest differences between this ceasefire and those of 
the past that have failed. The IVC, based out of Amsterdam, is trying to build on the 
announced cessation of armed activity, hoping that it is just the beginning of a full 
disarmament by ETA.  Independent, international committees like the IVC have proven 
to be useful in various situations of conflict resolution, such as in Northern Ireland with 
the IRA, South Africa, and Burundi.159 They have been used to monitor and ensure the 
implementation of agreements. 
This move from ETA comes in part because of a weakening of ETA’s militant 
leadership due to various arrests of important ETA leaders. But, while this is one major 
factor for the decline of ETA militant activity, the group has taken significant steps on its 	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own to wean off of violence. Its political wing has committed itself to peaceful 
independence struggle, with those who called the ceasefire of 2011 still in power, and no 
deaths attributed to the group since 2009. Furthermore, a public appeal from international 
leaders such as Kofi Annan and Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams for ETA to “embrace 
peace” and follow steps similar to those taken by the IRA in Northern Ireland after the 
Good Friday Agreement, acted as a precursor to their declaration as well.160 Indeed, the 
involvement of the IVC is an example of the success of this appeal, as a verification 
committee is one of the steps taken by the IRA that ETA had been asked to imitate. It is 
also useful when comparing this situation with that of the IRA in Northern Ireland, that it 
is likely a decision by the group to lay down arms will “provoke the appearance of 
splinter groups dedicated to keeping the violence going”.161 Acknowledgment that this 
will likely occur, and appropriate analysis and reaction that it may not be a valid 
indication of the groups’ attitudes could be indispensable in preserving the peace process 
and ensuring that it doesn’t collapse.  
In another indication of the change in ETA’s strategies and new commitment to 
peace, prior to the disarmament move, several hundred ETA prisoners had called on 
militants to end the violence.162 Furthermore, a group of 70 former prisoners and 
members of ETA met in the Basque Spanish town of Durango on January 4th and issued a 
statement saying they recognized the multilateral “damage” and suffering that they had 
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caused, and intend to act “responsibly with positive and constructive will and vision”.163 
Again, the Spanish government’s reaction to this was not one appropriate to fostering 
peace with ETA. They called the event at which this announcement was made a “witches 
Sabbath” which mirrored the rhetoric of the inquisition and could be deemed anything 
but reconciliatory. There is no reason, however, to believe that this sentiment is 
disingenuous. Indeed, even back in September of 2010, when the ceasefire was first 
announced, the Collective of Basque Political Prisoners (EPPK) released a statement 
declaring its support for a permanent truce and signed the 2010 Guernica agreement 
which demands a laying down of arms in favor of peace talks. That collective is made up 
of more than 700 Spanish and French prisoners of varying levels of leadership in ETA.164 
The more recent announcement made by the 70 Basque prisoners recently released, if 
anything, only confirms that the sentiment the EPPK expressed more than two years ago 
is legitimate, lasting and widespread. 
Even with all these precursors to action, the Spanish government, for more than 
two years, has refused to enter into discussions with ETA and thus become an active 
participant in the peace process. ETA’s recent disarmament move has, unfortunately, 
failed to change that thus far. The Spanish government’s reaction is discouraging, 
although understandable given the high number of failed ceasefires in the past. The 
government refuses peace talks with ETA while it still has arms in its arsenal, claiming 
that having such arms indicates that ETA is not fully committed to an unconditional 
peace. Less understandable, however, is Madrid’s dismissal of the verifier’s role in all 	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this. Spain’s Interior Minister, Jorge Fernandez Diaz, said at a news conference right 
before the announcement of ETA’s putting its arms beyond use, that “[W]ith all respect, 
we do not need these international verifiers”.165 He explained that the Civil Guard and 
police are enough and that it was "[N]ot verifiers that defeated Eta, but the Spanish police 
and Civil Guard".166 The argument has been made that ETA could make the whereabouts 
of its weapons caches public but others, like one of ETA’s founding members Julen 
Madariaga, while supporting the disarmament move say that ETA should avoid the 
humiliation of handing arms over directly to the Spanish government, and thus 
legitimizing the role of the IVC.167 Again, the effectiveness of such committees to 
promote conflict resolution has been seen across the international arena, not least of 
which was the success of the Independent International Commission on Decommission 
(IDDC), which oversaw the peace process in Northern Ireland.    
Nonetheless, despite the understandable reluctance of the Spanish government, 
given ETA’s past, this attitude of indifference to ETA’s unilateral peace actions on the 
part of the Spanish government will have to change if there is to be any hope of the peace 
holding promise. As Kofi Annan said in his speech in San Sebastian in October 2011, 
“Those who live with it must be involved in the effort to end it. They must also see the 
benefits that justify the compromises and sacrifices involved.”168 Participation in the 	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peace process is a necessity for it to gain any steam. This is a sentiment that has been 
further reinforced by other international political leaders in the peace process, such as 
Desmond Tutu who are appealing to the Spanish government to enter into talks with 
ETA.169 
The Situation of Political Prisoners 
Arnaldo Otegi, a former leader of ETA’s political wing and jailed in 2009, gave 
an interview from jail presented in Mexico’s La Jornada, which provided insight as to 
why ETA has made the decision to forgo armed activity, and why the Spanish 
government is greeting it with seemingly so much resistance, “The disappearance of 
ETA’s armed violence creates a serious problem for [Spain], to the extent that there’s 
now no excuse not to tackle the real political debate, which is none other than respect for 
the Basque people’s right of self-determination.”170 While Otegi makes the point that he 
doesn’t believe the Spanish government really is interested in peace given their responses 
to the latest developments, he also reaffirmed ETA’s new position of non-violence saying 
that they have received the message from the ECHR (based on its ruling that upheld the 
illegalization of the Basque political parties associated with ETA) and understand it, and 
are taking it seriously that the international community will support restrictive policies 
that limit fundamental freedoms such as the right of association as long as ETA’s armed 
activity continues.  
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 The government in Madrid, while stating their main reason for not engaging in 
peace talks is because ETA has not turned over all its arms, also takes issue with 
discussing anything other than the conflict itself. A major theme in all of the ceasefires 
that ETA has announced was that they demanded certain concessions be made in regards 
to political prisoners. The Spanish government refuses to be held hostage to these 
demands and asserts that the ceasefires need to be unconditional.  
Nevertheless, ETA’s claims about the treatment of prisoners and violations of their rights 
are certainly pertinent, as the Spanish government has conducted policies in regards to 
prisoners that vary relatively little since the Franco era. The dispersal policy that Spain 
adopted in 1989 involves scattering ETA prisoners all across the country, rather than 
following the precedent of allowing them to be at a jail closest to their home or place of 
origin.171 This was done in part to punish the Basque separatists, but also to break their 
stronghold over prisoners since they are an important part of the organization’s discourse 
and decision-making. When Spain had followed the normal routine for prisoners of 
putting them in jails close to home, it meant so many ETA members in the same jails in 
the Basque country that it was easy for the organization to maintain control over them, 
and harder for prisoners to disengage from the group due to peer pressure. This policy, 
however, has meant undue hardships for families and prisoners and has led to one of the 
biggest issues that delays the peace process; the repatriation of political prisoners back to 
the Basque country.172  
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 Another policy towards political prisoners that only worsened the central 
government’s relations with ETA and the Basque citizenry is the Parot Doctrine. The 
Parot Doctrine, introduced by the Supreme Court in 2006, was a response to the 1973 
Criminal Code that allowed prisoners to be freed before the end of their sentence was 
served, based on “good behavior” and attending workshops and courses.173 The Spanish 
Penal system hands out terms that can be in hundreds, even thousands of years, but there 
is a 30 year-limit of time actually served. The Criminal Code of 1973 applied reductions 
to the 30 year limit, but under the Parot Doctrine, they were now applied to the full term 
handed out, effectively making it useless, and it also applied this decision retroactively.174 
It was overruled in the European Court of Human Rights on various accounts, including 
“illegal detention” and because aspects of it were unconstitutional.   
Many policies of the modern day prison system have roots that go back to Franco 
or beyond. For example, after the Spanish Civil War, 278 priests and 125 monks suffered 
imprisonment and/or deportation to other parts of Spain. This policy is greatly similar to 
the “dispersal policy” today that sends Basque prisoners to jails in different parts of Spain. 
Poor treatment of political prisoners, which remains a major issue between Basques and 
the current Spanish Government, was commonplace in Franco’s time. With major 
maltreatment as part of the past between the Spanish government and the Basques, it is 
no wonder that this is a sensitive issue for Basques today.  
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Moving Forward 
What Spain needs to remember and accept, is that the major problems that are the 
sticking points for ETA and the central government, like the political prisoners situation 
and, of course, independence, are not demands that are going to go away. Furthermore, 
even if people do not support the violent tactics of ETA, a demand for increased 
autonomy is widespread and legitimate. The Lehendakari made some remarks on local 
television in October 2012 that demonstrate both the perseverance and popularity of the 
drive for independence, backing the concept of an independence “of the 21st-century-
kind”.175 He has also tried to advance the argument for a “new bilateral relationship with 
Spain” referring to a revision of the autonomy statute. He also made remarks during his 
election campaign, and in his platform, or “manifesto”, about “becoming less and less 
dependent every day until we achieve independence.”176 
Urkullu’s words on this matter don’t sound as much hopeful as clairvoyant. His 
point is that the Basque independence trend is enduring. In this way and others, many 
parallels can be drawn between it and the Scottish independence movement. A comment 
made in a briefing on April 8th of this year by Alex Salmond, the first minister of 
Scotland, while in reference to Scotland could easily be applied to the Basque situation as 
well. Salmond said that while the timeline isn’t quite fixed, the “destination” is.177  The 
Spanish government’s reaction to the independence movement in Scotland is one of 	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support, but plays on the legality of the process to create a distinction between Scotland’s 
movement and secessionist pushes in its own country. The Spanish foreign minister José-
Manuel García-Margallo, told the Financial Times, “If Scotland becomes independent in 
accordance with the legal and institutional procedures, it will ask for admission [to the 
EU]. If that process has indeed been legal, that request can be considered. If not, then 
not.”178 By basing its acceptance of the outcome of the Scottish independence referendum 
on the fact that the independence movement abides by a legal process, Spain is able to 
appear democratic about the concept of self-determination, while still managing to hold 
its position of non-recognition for referendums on independence held in Spain. The fact 
that referendums may only be called for by the Spanish central government gives the 
Spanish government the right to deny the votes on legal grounds. Making this legal 
argument is a way, in part, for Spain to also appear less dictatorial in the eyes of the rest 
of E.U. by appealing to European logic and reason. In reality, as much as independence is 
a part of Basque culture, detest of territorial fragmentation and self-determination is a 
part of the Spanish central government’s culture. This is true regardless of whether it is 
the PP or the PSOE in power.  
The Spanish government does not just dislike the idea of self-determination– it is 
positively frightened by it. It seems there is a great fear that a “domino”-like effect will 
take place if they allow even one territory to pursue the path of independence. One way 
to combat this fear of territorial disintegration, which Spain, Russia under Stalin, Turkey, 
and many other countries have tried, is to be hyper-vigilant and forceful in suppression of 	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dissent. But in many of these instances and certainly as we’ve seen in the case of Spain, 
this only acts to intensify independence forces and the desire to strengthen cultural 
distinctness. Plain and simple, this approach that Spain has taken historically, and is 
continuing to take today is not working. Undermining of the Basque fueros system led to 
revival of Basque culture. Suppression of Basque culture under Franco led to the creation 
of ETA. Violence on the part of the Civil Guard sent to squelch ETA forces and the 
creation of paramilitary GALs to terrorize and reel in ETA only multiplied its supporters 
and sympathizers. This is a pattern that has failed and will fail again if it continued by the 
Spanish government. Instead, for reasons outlined in this thesis, it would be more 
advisable to take two approaches to the current situation, which might finally alter the 
path of Basque-Spanish relations. One path should be in regards to the handling of ETA 
and their most recent move of putting weapons beyond use, and the other should be in 
regards to the independence movement as a whole and the Basque Autonomous Region’s 
government.  
Creating Lasting Peace with ETA 
The approach that needs to be taken in regards to ETA should mimic that of the 
IRA when they disarmed in Northern Ireland, and should be overseen with the help of the 
IVC. While ETA has announced this ceasefire is an irreversible one and will be carried 
out unilaterally if need be, the history of failed ceasefires in the past means that despite 
such proclamations, Spain should not squander the opportunity for peace or take such 
affirmations from ETA as guarantees. While it is true that this is the first time that 
disarmament and the consultation of an IVC has taken place during a ceasefire, without 
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addressing those issues that have always been sticking points in negotiations, the peace 
process will likely be stalled. Rajoy’s government needs to enter into dialogue with ETA 
to begin to address these issues and work towards a lasting peace.  
ETA has announced its firm commitment to peace, but Spain, first and foremost, 
needs to announce this commitment as well. In the case of Northern Ireland, one of the 
central tenets for participation in negotiations of the Good Friday Agreement was the 
“total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means.”179 This 
commitment did not waiver at any point in the process of negotiations, and it is in this 
context that discussions between ETA and the government in Madrid must be carried out.  
Secondly, Spain needs to address the number one sticking point of the peace 
process, and the reason for the return of violence after many declared ceasefires: the issue 
of Basque political prisoners. The prisoners have announced their acceptance of a legal 
strategy to winning eventual exoneration, and commitment to “legal channels even when 
that implicitly implies for us the acceptance of our conviction.”180  They have publicly 
acknowledged the “suffering and multilateral” damage caused by the conflict. After 
making those declarations, they responded to Spanish politicians’ calls for further 
unilateral actions, such as giving up arms caches and disbanding, by putting their 
weapons beyond use. Their actions need to be met in part by the Spanish governments 
cooperation on the issue as well. The following steps should be taken in regards to ETA 
prisoners: 
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1) The Spanish State should end the application of exceptional measures 
that go above and beyond the normal procedures practiced in regards to 
ETA prisoners, and implement the legislative necessary reforms to do 
so.  
a. This would include the immediate release of seriously ill prisoners 
who should be set free, according to current legislation, in order to 
receive adequate treatment of their illnesses.181 
b. This includes ending the dispersal policy, and means the repatriation 
of all ETA prisoners to jails in the Basque country, in an effort to show 
that the changes in ETA’s attitude are being received by the Spanish 
government in good-faith, with the intention of their involvement in 
furthering the peace process. This should also be done so that ETA 
prisoner treatment is raised to the level of other Spanish prisoners, who 
are incarcerated in the prisons closest to their homes. 
c. This includes repealing the “Parot” Doctrine, which is applied solely 
to ETA prisoners to due to its nature and is thus an exceptional 
measure.  
2) The Spanish government should acknowledge the damage that the 
policy of dispersal has done to families.  
3) The Government in Madrid should begin handling the cases on a case-
by-case basis and prove it will be upholding the legal process.  
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4) The Government in Madrid should remain firm in its position that any 
other major concessions will only be negotiated after ETA has 
disarmed, so as not to undermine the importance of ETA prisoners’ 
accepting to a legitimate legal process of prisoner appeals on a case-by-
case basis.  
 
Negotiations, once they begin, cannot be stalled and need to be committed to fully and 
non-violently. At no point should Spain respond with violence or force, as the likelihood 
for a return to violence on the part of ETA cannot be discounted.  
A New “Bilateral” Relationship with the Basque Country 
Regarding independence of the Basque country itself, a conciliatory and slow 
approach should be taken to allow for gradually more independence. Full independence is 
not an option at the moment and shouldn’t be for various strategic reasons. For one, the 
economy of Spain is not in a good enough position to lose all revenue it gets from the 
Basque country. Furthermore, Spain’s concerns about conceding to separatist demands 
right now are valid, because it does not want to appear as though it is giving into terrorist 
threats or demands. Until ETA fully disbands (or convincingly disowns violence as a 
political tool), Spain should not even consider allowing a referendum or any other major 
action on full independence to take place. Doing so would certainly give other separatist 
groups or parties in the country, but also worldwide, the idea that violence and terrorism 
are the best way to achieve independence. Instead, Rajoy’s government should agree to 
discussions with Urkullu about revising the autonomy statute. While granting full 
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independence would be inadvisable because it would make the Spanish government look 
weak, refusing any change whatsoever makes it appear hard, uncompromising, and more 
interested in holding power than in advancing the interests of all people within Spain. It 
could also have negative effects for the end of ETA. If ETA does disband unconditionally, 
an inflexible attitude from the central government would still meet major opposition in 
the Basque country and likely lead to social unrest. Furthermore, conceding full 
independence could very well prove to be the critical piece that leads to the unraveling of 
Spain’s territorial integrity. If independence of the Basque country occurred and it wasn’t 
through a legal process, there would be little stopping other regions like Cataluña, that are 
financially strong enough to support themselves, from declaring independence 
unilaterally as well. Spain’s response would probably be a huge influx of troops or the 
Guardia Civil and ultimately it’d be a massive drain on resources, violence would likely 
occur, and Spain would continue in its perpetual state of separatist tensions.  
Lehendakari Urkullu spoke of a new “bilateral” agreement with Spain and that is 
exactly what needs to happen. A reworking of the Basque country’s autonomy statute 
should be carried out and worked on in a collaborative effort by the Spanish and Basque 
parliaments. This solution would be a compromise for both sides, but would address both 
of their major issues as well, reaching minimum consensus. Spain would avoid changing 
the status-quo and setting the precedent that independence is possible for all of its distinct 
ethnic regions, but the Basque country would also gain increased autonomy, appeasing 
many separatist Basques who could see it as a step forward on the road to independence. 
At the same time, the Spanish government would not be forced into promising such 
independence. While conceding more freedom to the Basques may seem 
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counterproductive in ensuring the region doesn’t secede, it has actually been proven to 
work in the past. As a World Policy Institute article describing the Basque situation 
explains, the increased autonomy that Basques have been granted under their Autonomy 
Statute since Franco, while gradual, has resulted in Basques enjoying “[M]ore cultural 
and political liberty today than they have for centuries, which has [in turn] undermined 
the cause of self-determination.”182 A reworking of the Autonomy Statute as opposed to 
granting independence also allows the Spanish government to save face by showing that 
its policy of rejecting self-determination referendums and other legal attempts at 
secession is not one that they are now completely reversing, merely revising.  
Another benefit of agreeing to be more conciliatory and entering into a dialogue 
on changes to the Autonomy Statute is that it will make Spain look more democratic than 
it ever has before on the issue of self-determination. Mariano Rajoy’s government should 
take two steps regarding revisions to the constitution. First, Rajoy’s party should support 
an amendment that would allow secession, as currently it is illegal according to the 
constitution. And two, they should seek an amendment that allows regions to call 
unilateral referendums on the question of possible independence. While Rajoy has been 
quoted as saying that the door was “wide-open” for a constitutional change, his party 
would have to support it to pass, and it should. 183  Not allowing for, or rather blocking, a 
legal and democratic channel for regions to seek independence forces groups to look to 
other means, such as violence, revolution, or social upheaval. Amending the constitution 
to allow regions to call their own referendums on independence would be a major step in 	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granting more autonomy to the regions, and would also ensure the long-term peace of this 
measure by guaranteeing that future governments cannot block such referendums when 
they reach the national level (as Rajoy’s government has already done with Catalan). 
With the Basque region as just one of many groups seeking a fair, democratic process for 
independence, and the Catalan illegal referendum right around the corner, allowing a 
legal process to go through is important for maintaining peace.  
The best solution for Spain is to attempt a consociational democracy with the 
Basque country. Consociational democracies are “power-sharing” systems that are 
designed to “enable the various constituent parts of a highly fragmented society to share 
the same state, territory, and political institutions, while remaining at peace with one 
another and respectful of each other’s prerogatives.”184 They are characterized by four 
elements that are designed to allow for functional democracies in the context described. 
Those elements include: 1) grand coalition governments that include representatives of 
all major linguistic and religious groups, 2) cultural autonomy for these groups, 3) 
proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments, and 4) a 
minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy.185 Consociationalism has 
proven to be highly successful in many different societies, for creating a functioning 
democracy in a divided society, and has been implemented as an alternative to the “Plural 
Society Approach” or the “Incompatibility Theory”, developed by British economist J.S. 
Furnivall, that argues the only way such societies could be held together is through the 
application of external forces. Consociational theory states that consensus can govern 	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such societies much better than the traditional, majoritarian model and tries to share, 
disperse, and limit power in a variety of ways.186 Countries that are good examples of the 
success of consociational democracy are Switzerland, Canada, Malaysia, Holland, 
Austria, and Luxembourg, just to name a few. Significantly, consociational approaches 
are flexible and can be accommodated to diverse national situations; there are in fact 
many ways in which consociationalism can be implemented, as long as those four key 
factors above are addressed. Consociational democracies score significantly higher on a 
wide array of indicators of democratic quality.187 Based on extant statistical evidence, 
consociational democracies– if implemented prudently– often lead to improvement in 
quality of public services, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of 
law.188 
 Evidence of the application of consociational institutions in the Basque country 
exists, but as Arend Lijphart explains in his article The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A 
Consociational Interpretation, as a country is “less firmly consociational” and power 
sharing is weak or weakened in any of the four necessary categories, it can be expected to 
be accompanied by increases in intergroup tensions and violence. Spain and the Basque 
country have several power-sharing institutions but all of them could and should be 
strengthened to give consociationalism a better chance, the result of which should be less 
violence and intergroup tension.189 The aspects that are most lacking in Spain, and are 
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necessary to form a consociational democracy, are government by grand coalition, and 
mutual veto.190 In regards to the grand coalition, Spain has been consistently governed by 
a single-party majority and regional deputies have played no significant role in the 
governing majorities. Likewise, the mutual veto is not part of the Spanish system.191 
Regimes in the ethnic homelands cannot prevent the Spanish government from imposing 
any measure it wishes on the autonomous communities, thanks to Article 155 of the 
Spanish constitution, which also allows Madrid to seize the operations (in whole or in 
part) of any Autonomous Community’s government in case of crises or rebellion.192  This 
ability to withdraw autonomy that lies with Madrid shows that the “autonomy” granted to 
the communities is not permanent and the power sharing that does occur is not secure or 
equal.  
In regards to segmental autonomy, the Basques do have a fair degree of self-
governance over the internal affairs of the autonomous community, and gradually the 
maintenance of public order has become more localized, which has enhanced the region’s 
control even more. There are still major shortcomings, however, in the power over 
administration of justice in the different regions. Lijphart’s final component, 
proportionality in political representation, fares the best of all four traits of 
consociationalism. The system favors the larger parties, but that actually works well for 
the Basque and Catalan regions, as their ethnic nationalist parties have been entrenched 	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for generations and are the largest parties in the regions.193 This area too has its 
shortcomings, however, as there are no provisions for ensuring ethnic representation in 
the Spanish civil bureaucracy, within the Basque Autonomous Region.194 In order to 
institute a power-sharing system that could effectively accommodate regional 
autonomous demands, and thus ameliorate tensions between the Basque and Spanish 
governments, these conditions must be met, and a genuinely consociational approach 
may be the most effective way to cut the knot that has tied up progress toward workable 
accommodation of regional autonomy.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, with ETA appearing to be truly committed to an end of violent 
activities for the first time, the moment is ripe for the Spanish Government to revise its 
policy towards the Basque country. An opportunity to end a conflict of over 50 years’ 
duration, and with what is regarded as Europe’s last major terrorist group, is one that 
should not be wasted. The situation of the political prisoners has always proven to be a 
sticking point in negotiations with ETA and should be addressed now, once and for all, to 
give this ceasefire the best chance of success. Basque nationalism is a part of Basque 
identity, is not on the decline, and it is highly unlikely that the Basque desire for 
independence will go away anytime soon, based on the latest regional election data. Of 
course, Spain can continue on the path it always has and respond to regional demands for 
autonomy and independence by cracking down harder, sending in the army or the 
Guardia Civil, but the response will most likely be sustained, or even increased levels of 	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nationalist support for the regions. Such an approach would be patently 
counterproductive and it appears that even the Spanish national government itself is 
becoming more aware of this. It would burden Spain’s already unhealthy economy with 
financial strains as they use more resources to try and subvert the independence 
movements. Continued resistance and use of force could also easily lead to the return of 
violence on the part of ETA, as the declared ceasefire is still fragile, and could even lead 
to the creation of violent terrorist groups in other parts of the country, like Catalonia, who 
have exhausted all political and peaceful avenues to obtain increased autonomy still to no 
avail. The different regional ethnic communities may grow frustrated as they continue to 
be denied the opportunity to rework their autonomy statutes, despite the limitations they 
have as a result of the context in which they were created, which consisted of many 
Francoist supporters still in government.  
Essentially, while Spain’s approach to the Basques or its other regions does not 
necessarily have to change due to any external or internal factors right now, maintaining 
the status quo will put no dent in the Basque country’s nationalist drive. On the other 
hand, increasing autonomy may offer a future that is far brighter, and less resource 
intensive for the Spanish government. In the words of Lehendakari Urkullu, it could be 
the dawning of a new “bilateral” relationship that could lift Basque and Spanish relations 
to new heights. Either way, it will continue to be an interesting political climate in the 
next several years, and until the demands for increased autonomy on the part of the 
Basque people are answered, the region will never sit entirely peacefully within the 
Spanish nation. 
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Addendum 
Fragmentation seems to be on the rise in Europe and many people fear what this 
will mean for the European Union and its member countries. The amount of secessionist 
movements that exist in Europe currently numbers in the twenties, and while many of 
them are unfeasible, several have taken off and it is important to look at what the success 
of any one of them would mean for the others, and for the E.U. as a whole. Many 
independence movements have arisen from recent economic crisis but others, like 
Scotland and the Basque country, while certainly exacerbated by economic crises actually 
have roots in deeper historical and cultural issues. These are the type of movements that 
are most likely to succeed and it is important to think about the implications of their 
success. 
One of the major questions regarding the status of a successful independence 
movement in the E.U. is what will happen to the new nation in terms of E.U. membership. 
Automatic membership would not be granted and the standard process of applying for 
E.U. membership would apply according to the current President of the European 
Commission, Jose Manuel Barosso.195 This includes the approval of all current member 
states, a problem that Kosovo is familiar with. Kosovo, which formally seceded from 
Serbia in 2008 with major nations backing it such as the U.S., is still unrecognized by a 
handful of member countries of the E.U, Spain included.196 This potential state of limbo 
that newly independent countries could find themselves in has been used by many to try 
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and deter secessionist movements. Furthermore, entry into the E.U. raises questions for 
Scotland such as what currency to use, and for independence movements in the Basque 
country or Catalonia this is even more complicated. If they succeeded in gaining 
independence they would be a part of the eurozone, without having been officially 
recognized as a member of the E.U. yet. This is one of the many details that complicates 
the feasibility and economic predictions and calculations of the sovereignty movements. 
Another fear associated with fragmentation for the European Union is associated 
with “balkanization” and the idea that it will reverse or at least halt integration and yield 
hostile, non-cooperative states that are bent on proclaiming their distinct identities. Again 
the fear that secessionist movements will take off in a domino-like effect with the success 
of just one has caused many to condemn the Scottish referendum that is to take place in 
September. Ex-Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, in a recent interview said 
the independence of Scotland would be “cataclysmic” in geopolitical terms, and warns of 
underestimating what this would do to existing global balances.197 He also cited evidence 
of the effects it would have on other independence movements, such as the Flemish, who 
have openly stated that if Scotland breaks free and becomes a member of the European 
Union, they would like to be next. 
The Basque government will look at the outcome of the Catalan referendum on 
independence, too, if it is indeed held in November as scheduled. The Spanish central 
government has shown no indication of changing its tune in regards to the referendum. 
Newspapers in Spain have reported that legally, the government could declare treason 	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and would have the right to send in the Spanish military to the province.198  Plans for the 
referendum are still underway, however. It would be non-binding, much like those that 
were held in Quebec in 1980 and 1995 and the President of Catalonia, Artur Mas, claims 
that this makes it legal under the Spanish legal framework.199 Mas has indicated both a 
strong commitment to abiding by the law and the right to vote on independence; he is 
thus looking for a legal way to hold the referendum, but has also said that if it does get 
blocked, the next Catalonian election in 2016 will serve as a proxy vote on 
independence.200 Meanwhile, Rajoy’s government has taken increased measures to 
restrict Catalan expression of identity as a means of punishing nationalist sentiment in the 
lead up to the referendum. One example of this is the recent strict enforcement of an old 
law that required Spanish vessels to fly a Spanish flag that is bigger and more prominent 
than any regional flag that was displayed.201 These continued attempts to subvert regional 
identity refute any possibility of the Spanish government moving towards a more 
comprehensive political solution to its regional problems, or reworking policies to allow 
regions more autonomy.  
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